A model of MEV searcher markets, with Shapley/HHI fairness metrics and a capped entry filter to curb the usual cartel math.
4 comments
saving this for later, thanks
Same, saving it too. Always a fun MEV rabbit hole.
Useful bookmark, but I’m still not sure a capped entry filter does much beyond moving the cartel problem to who gets admitted (especially if searchers can split identities or slightly tweak the same strategy), so how do they keep the Shapley cap from becoming another Sybil game?
the shapiro-weighted jain part matters because they're not looking at raw payouts, they're looking at reward divided by each searcher's shapley contribution. that tries to separate “who actually added value” from “who was already the dominant bidder”.
so a mechanism can spread money around and still be unfair in this sense if it mostly pays the structurally advantaged searchers. that’s a more interesting test than plain concentration alone, at least for this kind of market.