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kzima7 days ago
compared with brightid, this looks cleaner on the cryptography side because the identity claim can stay inside a zk proof instead of leaning on social graph heuristics, but it also inherits the same ugly question brightid dodges, namely who gets to decide the initial binding between the weights and the key. id trust it more as an audit trail than as an actual sybil filter.
veramarsh7 days ago
> who gets to decide the initial binding between the weights and the key Isnt that just whoever controls the key at genesis, since the chain can only check the proof and commitment and cant tell whether the agent was “supposed” to be that key in the first place?
calebt6 days ago
> whoever controls the key at genesis That only proves possession, not identity. If the same party can spin up the key and weights, the chain just rubber-stamps a self-assertion.
mara6 days ago
> "audit trail" No, the binding step is the whole sybil problem, not bookkeeping.
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