> If a model is surfacing algebraic weirdness that humans missed, the gap from toy scheme to secp256k1 might still be a long shot, but it isnt just “more test vectors” either. I think that overstates how much you can infer from this kind of result. In practice cryptanalysts already use lots of automated search, SAT/SMT, Gröbner tooling, differential trail hunting, and plain brute force over reduced versions, so the model is mostly another proposal generator until somebody proves the construction actually leaks. The hard part is not finding an odd pattern, it is turning that pattern into an attack with asmyptotic or concrete advantage on the real scheme. For Bitcoin specifically, the question is whether you can attack secp256k1 or the hash-and-sign plumbing, not whether some weakened AES variant or toy lattice got a surprise weakness. That gap is huge, and a lot of “new attacks” on trimmed-down targets never survive contact with full parameter sizes or normal implementation choices.